The "Eleventh" Reception: Xi's Concerns and Officials' Apprehension

The black-and-white image from the CCP's "Eleventh" reception resembles rows of large floral wreaths found in a funeral home. (Video screenshot)

[People News] On the eve of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the party held the "Eleventh" reception in Beijing on the evening of September 30. Given that the Fourth Plenary Session involves significant personnel changes at the upper echelons of the CPC, this event clearly serves as a high-level power-sharing meeting that addresses the interests of various factions. In the lead-up to the meeting, all factions are expected to engage in fierce competition, resulting in intense internal conflicts, leaving many officials with uncertain futures. Even though they were seated at the banquet of the "Eleventh" reception on the evening of September 30, they appeared visibly anxious.

Through the lens of the party media, it was observed that the CCP officials appearing before the cameras at the "Eleventh" reception were all devoid of smiles, their expressions tense, and their bodies stiff, as if they were sitting on pins and needles. Perhaps these officials understand that their presence at the National Day reception does not guarantee their safety. How many more days can they retain the power and interests they currently hold? Even when CPC leader Xi Jinping entered the banquet hall with the Standing Committee, although he waved while walking, his expression was grim, and he showed no signs of joy, appearing deeply concerned.

The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th National Congress of the CPC is scheduled to take place in Beijing from October 20 to 23. The official announcement states that the meeting will focus on the "Suggestions on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2026-2030)," referred to as the '15th Five-Year Plan.'

American political commentator Tang Jingyuan has indicated that the '14th Five-Year Plan' may be a relatively minor topic at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session, with the primary focus likely on significant changes within the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party and a potential shift in supreme power. Despite Xi Jinping's ongoing high-profile appearances, Tang believes that the military parade in Beijing, along with his visits to Tibet and Xinjiang, reveal a consistent trend beneath the surface excitement: his status is being diminished. The question of whether Xi will cede some power or step back to a secondary role after the Fourth Plenary Session, or even resign before the 21st National Congress, continues to be a topic of intense discussion.

Recently, reports have emerged suggesting that Xi Jinping is seeking to solidify his power by requesting that the Trump administration officially oppose Taiwan's independence. In response, the U.S. State Department affirmed that America's stance on Taiwan remains unchanged; it opposes any unilateral alterations to the status quo and highlighted that the Chinese Communist Party poses the greatest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Evidently, regarding the Taiwan issue, the United States has openly stripped away the Chinese Communist Party's facade of 'for national reunification.' Ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session, it is not granting Xi Jinping the opportunity to portray himself as 'guiding the direction' of domestic affairs, thus preventing him from consolidating his personal influence.

Commentator Tang Jingyuan has analysed and noted that there are differences in how the party's leadership status is expressed when comparing the official report from the Politburo meeting in September 2020. The 2020 report on the '14th Five-Year Plan' stated the necessity of upholding the party's comprehensive leadership and improving the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. In contrast, this time the wording has changed to 'must uphold the party's comprehensive leadership and resolutely maintain the authority of the Central Committee and centralised unified leadership.' The party referred to previously was not an abstract concept; it specifically pointed to Xi Jinping, as he was the sole leader in 2020. However, this time, the focus has shifted to centralised unified leadership.

Tang Jingyuan believes that those in power within the party may resort to any means to protect the party. 'Thus, whether Xi Jinping can step down at the Fourth Plenary Session is akin to a lottery; both outcomes are possible.'

Additionally, commentator Li Yanming published an article in The Epoch Times, highlighting that a comparison of the congratulatory messages sent to Tibet from Zhongnanhai this year and in 2021 reveals that Xi's 'core' status is no longer acknowledged. Firstly, in the congratulatory message from four years ago, the so-called achievements in Tibet since the 18th National Congress were credited to 'the strong leadership of the Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core.' In this year's message, the credit is given to 'the Central Committee's high regard,' 'the party's strategy for governing Xinjiang,' and 'the strong leadership of the Central Committee,' with no mention of 'Xi as the core.'

Secondly, the congratulatory message from four years ago lauded Xi's speech at the centenary celebration of the Communist Party, stating it 'pointed out the direction for progress' and 'provided fundamental guidelines.' The latest congratulatory message lacks similar references.

Thirdly, the congratulatory message from four years ago specifically highlighted Xi Jinping's visit to Tibet for inspection and research, where he set forth new requirements. In stark contrast, the latest congratulatory message issued on September 25 of this year made no mention of Xi's trip to Xinjiang.

Compared to the congratulatory message sent to Tibet four years ago, the recent message to Xinjiang has omitted any flattering remarks about Xi, significantly downplaying the notion of 'Xi's core' leadership.

Li Yanming also pointed out several unusual aspects of Xi Jinping's recent visit to Xinjiang. For instance, Xi did not deliver a speech during the celebratory events in Xinjiang, and he was not accompanied by the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission at any point during the trip. On the afternoon of September 23, Xi met with officers of colonel rank and above stationed in Urumqi, but the commander of the Xinjiang Military District, General Liu Lin, and the political commissar, General Yang Cheng, were notably absent. Both are former subordinates of Xi's close ally, Miao Hua, who had been significantly promoted.

Moreover, videos and photos from Xi's on-site activities reveal that Wang Huning, a Politburo Standing Committee member considered a close confidant of Xi, repeatedly placed his hands behind his back while looking down at Xi during his speech. Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi and Politburo member He Lifeng displayed similar gestures, which starkly contrasted with the respectful demeanour of other officials. The 'disrespectful' posture of Wang Huning and others in Xi's presence is interpreted as a public act of contempt or even a challenge, breaching a significant taboo within the CCP's political culture; this has sparked public interest and intense discussions regarding Xi's waning status as 'the sole leader.'

In fact, since the Third Plenary Session in mid-July 2024, rumours have been circulating about Xi Jinping's critical health and the possibility of a coup, with a series of incidents involving military loyalists. Signs indicating Xi's diminishing power and loss of control over the military have increasingly come to light. The propaganda efforts by the CCP's party media to support Xi and 'maintain Xi's core' have noticeably diminished.

Beyond the party, even the media affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military has been voicing opinions that diverge from those of Xi Jinping, stressing concepts such as 'democratic centralism,' 'collective leadership,' and 'intra-party democracy.' They have clearly opposed 'one-man rule' and have stopped mentioning the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In response, the CCP Politburo and party media have also highlighted the importance of 'centralised and unified leadership.'

Since 2025, Xi's power crisis has been intensifying, and it has been nine months since he last promoted any generals, which is highly unusual. During Xi's military parade on September 3, the parade commander was downgraded to a lieutenant general; notably, Zhang Youxia (张又侠) sat in the front row of the Tiananmen Gate alongside both current and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Shortly after the parade, Zhang Youxia awarded astronauts, notably refraining from praising Xi.

The article concludes by noting that numerous signs suggest that the CCP's party media and high-ranking officials in Zhongnanhai appear to be systematically signalling Xi's diminishing power, likely preparing the ground for public opinion to facilitate his departure.

Many experts and scholars resonate with the sentiments of the grassroots Chinese populace, strongly expressing their desire for the Communist Party to step down, for Xi Jinping to resign, to end the CCP's tyrannical rule, and to provide the Chinese people with a chance to survive.

(First published by People News) △